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Abstract. Many distributed systems can be modeled as network games:
a collection of selfish players that communicate in order to maximize
their individual utilities. The performance of such games can be evalu-
ated through the costs of the system equilibria: the system states in which
no player can increase her utility by unilaterally changing her behavior.
However, assuming that all players are selfish and in particular that all
players have the same utility function may not always be appropriate.
Hence, several extensions to incorporate also altruistic and malicious be-
havior in addition to selfishness have been proposed over the last years.
In this paper, we seek to go one step further and study arbitrary rela-
tionships between participants. In particular, we introduce the notion of
the social range matrix and explore the effects of the social range matrix
on the equilibria in a network game. In order to derive concrete results,
we propose a simplistic network creation game that captures the effect
of social relationships among players.
1 Introduction
Many distributed systems have an open clientele and can only be understood
when taking into account socio-economic aspects. A classic approach to gain
insights into these systems is to assume that all players are selfish and seek to
maximize their utility. Often, the simplifying assumption is made that all players
have the same utility function. However, distributed systems are often “socially
heterogeneous” whose participants run different clients and protocols, some of
which may be selfish while others may even try to harm the system. Moreover, in
a social network setting where members are not anonymous, some players may
be friends and dislike certain other players. Thus, the state and evolution of the
system depends on a plethora of different utility functions. Clearly, the more
complex and heterogeneous the behavior of the different network participants,
the more difficult it becomes to understand (or even predict) certain outcomes.
In this paper, we propose a more general approach to model the players’
utilities and introduce a social range matrix. This matrix specifies the perceived
costs that are taken into account by the players when choosing a strategy. For
example, a player who maliciously seeks to hamper the system performance has
a perceived cost that consists of the negative costs of the other players. On the
other hand, an altruistic player takes into account the costs of all other players
and strives for a socially optimal outcome. There are many more player types
in-between that care about some players but dislike others.
In order to gain insights into the implications of different social ranges, we
consider a novel network creation game that captures the willingness of a group of
people to connect to each other. In this game, players do not incur infinite costs if
they are not connected to some players. Rather, the utility of a player is given by
the number of other players in her R-neighborhood, for some parameter R. For
instance, in a game with R = 1, players can only collaborate with and benefit
from their direct neighbors. Or imagine a peer-to-peer network like Gnutella
where files are searched by flooding up to a certain radius (e.g., a time-to-live of
R = TTL = 5), then a player is mainly interested in the data shared in her 5-
hop neighborhood. Our motivation in using this model stems from its simplicity
which allows to exemplify and quantify the effects of different social matrices.
1.1 Related Work
Over the last years, several models for distributed systems have been proposed
that go beyond purely selfish settings. For instance, security and robustness re-
lated issues of distributed systems have been an active field of research, and
malicious faults are studied intensively (e.g., [5, 14]). To the best of our knowl-
edge, the first paper to study equilibria with a malicious player is by Karakostas
and Viglas [13] who consider a routing application where a single malicious player
uses his flow through the network in an effort to cause the maximum possible
damage. In order to evaluate the impact of such malicious behavior, a coordi-
nation ratio is introduced which compares the social costs of the worst Wardrop
equilibrium to the social costs of the best minimax saddle-point. In [9], imple-
mentation problems are investigated with k faulty players in the population, but
neither their number nor their identity is known. A planner’s objective then is
to design an equilibrium where the non-faulty players act according to her rules.
Or in [1], the authors describe an asynchronous state machine replication pro-
tocol which tolerates Byzantine, Altruistic, and Rational behavior. Moscibroda
et al. [17] discovered the existence of a so-called fear factor in the virus inocula-
tion game where the presence of malicious players can improve the social welfare
under certain circumstances. This windfall of malice has subsequently also been
studied in the interesting work by Babaioff et al. [4] on congestion games.
There exists other work on game theoretic systems in which not every partic-
ipating agent acts in a rational or malicious way. In the Stackelberg theory [19],
for instance, the model consists of selfish players and players that are controlled
by a global leader. The leader’s goal is to devise a strategy that induces an opti-
mal or near optimal so-called Stackelberg equilibrium. Researchers have recently
also been interested in the effects of altruism that co-exists with selfishness [12,
15]. For example, Meier et al. [15] have shown (for a specific game played on
a social network) that friendship among players is always beneficial compared
to purely selfish environments, but that the gain from social ties does not grow
monotonically in the degree of friendship.
In contrast to the literature discussed above, we go one step further and
initiate the study of games where players can be embedded in arbitrary social
contexts and be selfish towards certain players, be friends with some other play-
ers, and even have enemies.
In particular, we apply our framework to a novel network creation game
(for similar games, see the connection games described in Chapter 19.2 of [18]).
Network creation has been a “hot topic” for several years. The seminal work by
Fabrikant et al. [10] in 2003 seeks to shed light on the Internet’s architecture
as built by economic agents, e.g., by Internet providers or autonomous systems.
Recent subsequent work on network creation in various settings includes [2, 3,
6–8]. Moscibroda et al. [16] considered network creation games for peer-to-peer
systems. The game proposed in our paper here can be motivated by peer-to-peer
systems as well. However, in contrast to [16] where peers incur an infinite cost
if they are not all connected to each other, we believe that our model is more
appropriate for unstructured peer-to-peer systems.
The notion of interpersonal influence matrix, similar to our social range ma-
trices, is used in sociology for understanding the dynamics of interpersonal agree-
ment in a group of individuals (see, e.g., [11]).
1.2 Our Contributions
The main contribution of this paper is the introduction and initial study of the
social range matrix which allows us to describe arbitrary social relationships
between players. For instance, social range matrices can capture classic anarchy
scenarios where each player is selfish,monarchy scenarios where players only care
about one network entity, or coalitions that seek to support players within the
same coalition but act selfishly or maliciously towards other coalitions. Despite
this generality, we are able to derive interesting properties of such social matrices.
For instance, we show that there are matrix transformations that do not affect
the equilibria points (and the convergence behavior) of a game.
In addition, as a case study, we analyze a simplistic social network creation
game where players can decide to which other players they want to connect.
While a new connection comes at a certain cost, a player can also benefit from
her neighborhood. That is, we assume that the players’ utility is given by the
number of other players they are connected to up to a certain horizon, minus the
cost of the links they have to pay for. For example, this game can be motivated by
unstructured peer-to-peer systems where data is usually searched locally (in the
peers’ neighborhood) and overall connectivity is not necessarily needed. We focus
on this game due to its simplicity that allows us to study the main properties of
the social matrix and exemplify the concepts. For example, in a social context
where players can choose their neighbors, it is likely that players will connect to
those players who they are friends with. We will show that this intuition is correct
and that social relationships are indeed often reflected in the resulting network.
As another example, we show that the social welfare of monarchic societies can
be higher than that of anarchic societies if the price of establishing a connection
is relatively low; otherwise, the welfare is lower.
Our new model and the network creation game open a large number of re-
search directions. We understand our work as a first step in exploring the effect
of social ranges on the performance of network games and use this paper to
report on our first insights.
1.3 Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We describe our model and formally
introduce the social range matrix in Section 2. Section 3 presents our first insights
on the properties of a social range matrix. We then report on our case study
on social network formation (Section 4). The paper is concluded with a brief
discussion and an outlook on future research directions in Section 5.
2 Social Range Matrices and Perceived Equilibria
In this section, we introduce the concept of a game theory where players are
embedded in a social context; in particular, we define the social range matrix F
describing for each player i how much she cares about every other player j.
We consider a set Π of n players (or nodes), Π = {0, . . . , n− 1}. Let Xi be
the set of possible strategies player i can pursue in a given game G. A strategy
profile s ∈ X0 × . . . × Xn−1 specifies a configuration, i.e., s is the vector of the
strategies of all players.
The cost that actually arises at a player i in a given strategy profile s is de-
scribed by its actual cost function ca(i, s). However, depending on the social con-
text a player is situated in, it may experience a different perceived cost cp(i, s):
While a purely selfish player may be happy with a certain situation, another
player that cares about the actual costs of her friends may have a higher per-
ceived cost and may want to change her strategy to a socially better one. (Note,
however, that the distinction between “purely selfish players” and players that
take into account the utility or cost of other players is artificial: Players whose
action depends on other players’ utilities can be considered “purely selfish” as
well, and simply have a different cost function.)
Formally, we model the perceived costs of a given player as a linear combi-
nation of the actual costs of all other players in the game. The social range of
player i is a vector fi = (fi0, ..., fi(n−1)) ∈ Rn. Intuitively, fij quantifies how
much player i cares about player j, in both a positive (if fij > 0) and a negative
way (fij < 0). fij = 0 means that i does not care about j. The social ranges of
all the players constitute the social range matrix F = {fij} of the game. We will
later see (Lemma 1) that it is sufficient to focus on normalized matrices where
∀i, j : −1 ≤ fij ≤ 1 (rather than fij ∈ R).
The perceived cost of player i in a strategy profile s is thus calculated as:
cp(i, s) =
∑
j
fijca(j, s).
In other words, the perceived cost of player i increases with the aggregate costs
of i’s friends (players j with fij > 0) and decreases with the aggregate costs of
i’s enemies (players j with fij < 0). Note that we allow a player i to value other
players’ costs more than her own cost, i.e., fii can be smaller than some |fij |,
i 6= j. This captures the effect of sacrificing one’s own interests for the sake (or
for the harm) of others.
Henceforth, a social matrix F with all 1’s (resp., all −1’s, except for fii)
is called altruistic (resp., malicious). Generally, a social matrix with a lot of
zero or negligibly small elements describes a system with weak social ties. Some
interesting social range matrices F are:
1. If F is the identity matrix, we are in the realm of classic game theory where
each player is selfish.
2. A completely altruistic scenario is described by a social matrix F consisting
of 1s only, i.e., fij = 1 (∀i, j). Alternatively, we can also define an altruistic
player that considers her own costs only to a small extent (fii = ǫ, for some
arbitrarily small ǫ > 0).
3. In a situation where ∃k such that ∀i, j: fij = 0 except for fik = 1, the
players only care about a single individual. We will refer to this situation as
a monarchy scenario. (Sometimes it makes sense to assume that players are
at least a bit self-interested and ∀i: fii = ǫ for an arbitrarily small positive
ǫ.)
4. If ∃k such that ∀i, j: fij = 0 except for fkj = 1 (and maybe fkk = ǫ), there
is one benevolent player that seeks to maximize the utility of all players.
5. If ∃k such that for all players i: fii = 1 and otherwise 0, and fki = −1, we
have a selfish scenario with one malicious player k that seeks to minimize
the utility of all the players. (Alternatively, we can also postulate that for a
malicious player k, fkk = 1.)
6. If ∃j, k such that ∀i: fji = fki, then we say that players j and k collude:
their incentives to deviate from a given strategy profile are identical. (We
will show in Lemma 1 that j and k collude even if ∃λ > 0: ∀i, fji = λfki.)
There are special player types to consider, e.g.:
Definition 1 (Ignorant and Ignored Players). A player i is called ignorant
if fij = 0 ∀j; the perceived cost of an ignorant player i does not depend on the
actual costs. Now suppose that F contains a zero column: fji = 0, ∀j. In this
case, no player cares about i’s actual cost, and we call i ignored.
In game theory, (pure) Nash equilibria are an important solution concept to
evaluate the outcomes of games. A Nash equilibrium is defined as a situation
where no player can unilaterally reduce her cost by choosing another strategy
given the other players’ strategies. In our setting, where the happiness of a given
player depends on her perceived costs, the equilibrium concept also needs to
be expressed in terms of perceived costs. We formally define the perceived Nash
equilibrium (PNE) as follows.
Definition 2 (Perceived Nash Equilibrium). A strategy profile s is a per-
ceived Nash equilibrium if for every s′ that differs from s in exactly one position
i, we have cp(i, s
′) ≥ cp(i, s).
In order to evaluate the system performance, we study the social cost of an
equilibrium. Note that the social cost is defined with respect to actual costs: the
social cost of a strategy profile s is defined as Cost(s) =
∑
j ca(j, s). A strategy
profile s is a social optimum if ∀s′: Cost(s′) ≥ Cost(s).
For a given game G and a social matrix F , consider the ratio between the
actual cost of the worst perceived Nash equilibrium and the cost of the social
optimum. Comparing this ratio with the price of anarchy (the ratio computed
with respect to actual Nash equilibria), we obtain the “effect of socialization”
that captures the benefits or disadvantages that social relations contribute to
the outcome of the game. Below we fix a game G, and give some basic properties
following immediately from the definitions.
3 Basic Properties of Social Range Matrices
We start our analysis by examining properties of the social range matrix. First,
observe that F is invariant to row scaling.
Lemma 1. Let F be a social matrix, and let λ > 0 be an arbitrary factor. Let
F ′ be a social matrix obtained from F by multiplying a row of F by λ. Then
s is a perceived Nash equilibrium w.r.t. F if and only if s is a perceived Nash
equilibrium with F ′.
Proof. Let i be the player whose row is scaled. Since player i’s actual costs are
not affected by multiplying fi· by λ, the perceived costs of all other players j 6= i
remain the same and hence, they still play their equilibrium strategy under F ′.
However, also player i will stick to her strategy in F ′:
cp(i, s) =
∑
j
λfijca(j, s) ≤ cp(i, s′) =
∑
j
λfijca(j, s
′)
since we know that in F , cp(i, s) =
∑
j fijca(j, s) ≤ cp(i, s′) =
∑
j fijca(j, s
′) for
all s′ that differ from s in i’s strategy. ⊓⊔
In particular, Lemma 1 implies that we can normalize a social matrix F
by f ′ij = fij/maxℓ,k |fℓk|.1 Therefore, in the following, we assume normalized
matrices F for which fij ∈ [−1, 1], ∀i, j ∈ {0, . . . , n− 1}.
Lemma 2. If fij = 1 ∀i, j, then every social optimum is a perceived Nash
equilibrium. If fij = −1 ∀i, j, then every social minimum is a perceived Nash
equilibrium.
1 Here we assume maxℓ,k |fℓk| > 0; otherwise, every strategy is a perceived Nash
equilibrium and the price of socialization is the worst possible.
Proof. The proof is simple. By the definition of a social optimum s,
∑
i ca(i, s) is
minimal, i.e., ∄s′ with
∑
i ca(i, s
′) <
∑
i ca(i, s). Thus, s is also an equilibrium if
fij = 1 ∀i, j, as ∄s′ for a given player j with cp(j, s′) =
∑
i ca(i, s
′) < cp(j, s) =∑
i ca(i, s).
Similarly for the minimum maximizing
∑
i ca(i, s) (∄s
′ with
∑
i ca(i, s
′) >∑
i ca(i, s)). Profile s is also a perceived equilibrium for fij = −1 ∀i, j, as ∄s′
for a given player j with cp(j, s
′) =
∑
i ca(i, s
′) > cp(j, s) =
∑
i ca(i, s). ⊓⊔
Note however that the opposite direction is not true: there may be games
with equilibria which are not optimal, even if all players are altruistic, namely
if the game exhibits local optima.
Another special case that allows for general statements are ignorant and
ignored players (see Definition 1). Note that neither ignorant nor ignored players
can benefit from their unilateral actions: their perceived cost functions do not
depend on their strategies. Moreover, no player’s perceived cost depends on the
actions of an ignored player. If s is a perceived equilibrium, then any strategy
s′ that differs from s only in position i, where i is an ignored player, is also
a perceived equilibrium. In other words, it is sufficient to determine the set of
equilibria PNE′ with respect to the strategies of non-ignored players Π ′.
Existing literature also provides interesting results on the properties and
implications of certain types of social matrices. For instance, from the work
by Babaioff et al. [4]—and even earlier, from the work by Karakostas and Vi-
glas [13]!—we know that there are games where the presence of players who draw
utility from the disutility of others, can lead to an increase of the social welfare;
this however only holds for certain game classes that are characterized by some
form of a generalized Braess paradox. Or from the work by Meier et al. [15], it
follows that in a virus inoculation game where the social range matrix depends
on the adjacency metrics of the social network, a society can only benefit from
friendship (positive entries in the social range matrix), although not always in a
monotonic manner.
Thus, in specific game classes, some “corner case” phenomena may be ob-
served for certain types of social matrices. In order to focus on the principal
properties of the social range, in the following we concentrate on our network
creation game. It turns out that in games where choosing the neighbors can be
a part of a player’s strategy, there is a strong correlation between the social ties
and the resulting network topology.
4 Case Study: Network Creation
In this section, we give a formal definition of our network creation game and
investigate the implications of different social ranges on the formed topologies.
4.1 A Network Creation Game
As a use-case for employing our game-theoretic framework, we propose a novel
simple network creation game where a node (or player) i can decide to which
other nodes j she wants to connect in an undirected graph. Establishing a con-
nection {i, j} (or edge) entails a certain cost; we will assume that connections
are undirected, and that one end has to pay for it. On the other hand, a player
benefits from positive network externalities if it is connected to other players
(possibly in a multi-hop fashion). We assume that the gain or cost of a player
depends on the number of players in her R-hop neighborhood, for some pa-
rameter R ≥ 0. For instance, a network creation game with R = 1 describes a
situation where players can only benefit from (or collaborate with) their direct
neighbors. As motivation for larger radii, imagine an unstructured peer-to-peer
network where searching is done by flooding up to radius R, and where the num-
ber of files that can be found increases monotonically in the number of players
reached inside this radius.
Formally, the actual cost of player i is given by:
ca(i, s) = α · si − g(
R∑
j=1
|Γ j(i, s)|)
where parameter α ≥ 0 denotes the cost per connection, si is the number of
connections player i pays for, and |Γ j(i, s)| specifies to how many nodes node i
is connected with shortest hop-distance j in a graph incurred by strategy profile
s. Moreover, g : Nn → R is a function that specifies the utility of being in
a connected group of a given size (here Nn = {0, . . . , n − 1}). For example,
g(x) = x denotes that the utility grows linearly with the number of nodes within
the given radius; a super-linear utility such as g(x) = x2 may be meaningful
in situations where the networking effects grow faster, and a sub-linear utility
g(x) =
√
x means that marginal utility of additional players declines with the
size. By convention, we assume that g(0) = 0.
Finally, note that multiple strategy profiles (and hence perceived Nash equi-
libria) can describe the same network topology where the links are payed by
different endpoints. Henceforth, for simplicity, we will sometimes say that a
given topology constitutes (or is) a social optimum or an equilibrium if the cor-
responding profiles are irrelevant for the statement, are clear from the context,
or if it holds for any strategy describing this network.
Given two network topologies of the same perceived costs but where one
topology has some additional edges that need to be paid by a given player, this
player is likely to prefer the other topology. That is, it often makes sense to
assume that a player does not completely ignore the own actual cost, that is,
∀i : fii = ǫ for an arbitrarily small ǫ > 0.
4.2 Social Optimum and Anarchy
First we describe the properties of the general network creation game in which
players behave in a selfish manner. Social optima are characterized in the fol-
lowing lemma. It turns out that cliques and trees are the most efficient networks
in our game.
Lemma 3. Consider the network creation game where ∀x ∈ Nn−1, g(x + 1) −
g(x) > α/2. Then in the case R = 1, the only social optimum is the clique, and in
the case R > 1, every social optimum is a tree of diameter at most min(R, n−1).
Proof. Let s be any strategy profile. We say that an edge in s is redundant if in
the strategy profile s′ derived from s by dropping this edge, the R-neighborhood
of all nodes remains the same. Every non-redundant edge connecting a player
with degree x to a player with degree y decreases the social cost by at least
g(x + 1) − g(x) + g(y + 1) − g(y) − α > 0. Naturally, every social optimum
s will not have redundant edges. In the case R = 1, the clique has the most
non-redundant edges, and thus is the only topology resulting from the social
optimum.
In the case R > 1, suppose that the network described by s is not connected
and does not contain redundant edges. Then every edge connecting the compo-
nents of the graph decreases the social cost by a positive value. Hence, we can
assume that the socially optimal topology is connected.
Now suppose that the network has diameter R′ > R. Consider two nodes i
and j such that j is at distance R′ from i. Then adding an edge connecting i and
j increases the R-neighborhood of each player by at least 1 and thus decreases
the social cost. Therefore, the diameter of the social optimum topology is at
most min(R, n− 1).
Finally, since over all connected graphs, trees have the least number of edges
and hence the cost is minimized, every social optimum results in a tree. ⊓⊔
In a selfish setting, players are less likely to connect to each other. Indeed,
even for relatively small α, nodes remain isolated, resulting in a poor welfare.
Lemma 4. In the network creation game, the set of isolated nodes is a Nash
equilibrium if and only if ∀x ∈ Nn, g(x) ≤ xα.
Proof. Consider the strategy profile with no edges: ∀j : sj = 0. If ∀x ∈ Nn,
g(x) ≤ xα, then unilaterally adding x edges may only increase the individual
(actual) cost by at least αx − g(x), so no node has an incentive to deviate. On
the other hand, if ∃x ∈ Nn, g(x) > xα, then every player has an incentive to add
at least x edges, and thus the “isolated” strategy cannot be an equilibrium. ⊓⊔
Lemmas 3 and 4 imply that in the case 1 < α < 2, the cost of the social
optimum in the linear network creation game (when g(x) = x) is n(n−1)(α/2−1)
for R = 1 and (n − 1)(α − 2) for R > 1, while the cost of the worst Nash
equilibrium is 0, i.e., selfishness may bring the system to a highly suboptimal
state.
Below we describe the conditions under which certain topologies, like cliques
and trees of bounded diameter, constitute Nash equilibria of the network creation
game.
Lemma 5. In the network creation game where R = 1, ∀x ∈ N⌊n/2⌋, such that
∀y ∈ Nn−x: g(2x) − g(x + y) ≥ α(x − y), every 2x-regular graph constitutes a
Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the strategy in which every player establishes x outgoing links
so that the resulting topology is 2x-regular. Unilaterally establishing y (non-
redundant) links instead of x (for any y ∈ Nn−x), a player pays the cost αy −
g(x+ y) ≥ αx − g(2x), so no player has an incentive to deviate. ⊓⊔
In the linear case with R = 1 and α < 1, Lemma 5 implies that the clique is
the only regular graph that results from an equilibrium: the only x that satisfies
the condition is ⌊n/2⌋. But in general, the resulting network may consist of up
to ⌊n/2x⌋ disconnected cliques of 2x players each.
Lemma 6. In the network creation game with R > 1, where g is a monotonically
increasing function on Nn such that α < g(n−1), every tree of diameter at most
min(R, n− 1) corresponds to a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the strategy in which every node but one maintains one edge so
that the resulting graph is a tree of diameter at least min(R, n− 1). Therefore,
n− 1 players have the cost α− g(n− 1) and one player has the cost −g(n− 1).
Every extra edge would be redundant, and dropping edges increases the cost by
at least g(n− 1)− g(n). Thus, no player has an incentive to deviate. ⊓⊔
Having described the classic setting with selfish players, we are ready to
tackle social contexts.
4.3 Social Equilibria
We now turn our attention to more general matrices F , where player pairs i
and j are embedded in a social context. For simplicity, we focus on values fij ∈
{−1, 0, ǫ, 1} where fij = −1 signifies that player i does not get along well with
player j, fij = 0 signifies a neutral relation, and fij = 1 signifies friendship. We
will sometimes assume that players care at least a little bit about their own cost,
i.e., ∀i : fii = ǫ for some arbitrarily small positive ǫ. (This also implies that a
player will not pay for a link which is already paid for by some other player.) We
make two additional simplifications: we have investigated the network creation
game where players can only profit from their direct neighbors (i.e., R = 1) in
more detail, and assume a linear scenario where the utility of being connected
to other players grows linearly in the number of contacts, that is, the marginal
utility of connecting to an additional player is constant: we assume that g(x) = x.
Clearly, in this scenario, the cost cp(i, s) (and also ca(i, s)) of a player i in
a strategy profile s is independent of connections that are not incident to i. In
this case, it holds that any social matrix F has a (pure) perceived equilibrium.
Lemma 7. In the linear network creation game with R = 1, any social range
matrix F has at least one pure perceived Nash equilibrium, for any α.
Proof. Recall that in the R = 1 case, a player i can only benefit from her
neighbors, that is, from a connection {i, j} that either i or the corresponding
neighbor j paid for. Player i will pay for the connection to player j if and
only if the gain from this link is larger than the link cost α. We have that by
establishing a new connection from player i to player j, the cost changes by
∆ cp(i) = fii · (α− 1)−fij ·1. If this cost is not larger than zero, it is worthwhile
for player i to connect; otherwise it is not. On the other hand, player j will
pay for a connection to player i iff ∆ cp(j) = fjj · (α− 1) − fji · 1 ≥ 0. As
the decision of whether to connect to a given player or not does not depend
on other connections, and as links cannot be canceled unilaterally, the resulting
equilibrium network is unique assuming that the players will not change to a
strategy of equal cost. ⊓⊔
Observe that the equilibrium topology found in Lemma 7 is only unique if
the cost inequalities ∆ cp are strict. Moreover, a given equilibrium topology can
result from different strategy profiles, namely if there are connections where both
players have an incentive to pay for the connection to each other.
Intuitively, we would expect that the network formed by the players reflects
the social context the players are embedded in. This can be exemplified in several
ways. The following lemma shows that for the case of binary social matrices, there
are situations where the social matrix translates directly into an equilibrium
adjacency matrix.
Lemma 8. In the linear network creation game with R = 1, assume a binary
social matrix F where ∀i, j : fij ∈ {0, 1} and where each player is aware of her
own cost, i.e., ∀i : fii > 0. Then, for 1 < α < 2, there is an equilibrium topology
that can be described by the adjacency matrix F ′ derived from F in the following
manner: (1) ∀i : f ′ii = 0 and (2) if fij = 1 for some i, j, then f ′ij = 1 and
f ′ji = 1.
Proof. The claim follows from the simple observation that for 1 < α < 2, a
player i is willing to pay for a connection to a player j if and only if fij = 1, as
the cost difference is given by ∆ cp(i) = α − fii − fij : If fij = 0, player i only
connects if α ≤ 1, and if fij = 1, it is worthwhile to pay for the connection as
long as α ≤ 2. Therefore, as long as 1 < α < 2, one endpoint will pay for the
link {i, j} (and thus: f ′ij = 1 and f ′ij = 1) if fij = 1 or fji = 1. Clearly, it also
holds that there are no loops (∀i : f ′ii = 0). ⊓⊔
Note that the condition that each player cares about her own cost is necessary
for Lemma 8 to hold; otherwise, if fii = 0, a player could trivially connect to
all players as this does not entail any connection costs. In this case, the social
matrix still describes a valid equilibrium adjacency matrix, however, there are
many other equilibria with additional edges.
4.4 Use Case: Anarchy vs Monarchy
A natural question to investigate in the context of social ranges is the relationship
between a completely selfish society (in game theory also known as an anarchy)
and a society with an outstanding individual that unilaterally determines the
cost of the players (henceforth referred to as a monarchy); as already mentioned,
we assume that the players always care a little bit about their own actual costs,
and hence in the monarchy, let ∀i : fii = ǫ for some arbitrarily small ǫ > 0, and
let ∀i : fij = 1 where player j is the monarch (we assume fji = 0 for all i 6= j).
Interestingly, while there are situations where a monarchy yields a higher
social welfare, the opposite is also true as there are settings that are better for
anarchies. The following result characterizes social optima, and Nash equilibria
for anarchy and monarchy settings.
Lemma 9. In the linear network creation game with R = 1, the social optimum
cost is (α/2 − 1)n(n − 1) if α < 2 and 0 otherwise, and the anarchy has social
cost (α/2− 1)n(n− 1) if α ≤ 1 and 0 otherwise. For the monarchy, there can be
multiple equilibria (of the same cost): for any α, there is always an equilibrium
with cost (α − 2)(n − 1); moreover, if α ≤ 1 there is an additional equilibrium
with the same cost.
Proof. We consider the social optimum, the anarchy and the monarchy in turn.
Social optimum: If α ≤ 2, then Lemma 3 implies that any social optimum
implies the clique, with the cost (α/2 − 1)n(n − 1). If α > 2, then every non-
redundant link increases the social cost by α − 2 and thus the set of isolated
nodes has the minimal cost, 0.
Observe that the social cost is given by the total number of edges k in the
network: k edges yield a connection cost of k · α, and the players are connected
to 2k other players, thus Cost(s) = k · α − 2k. Using Lemma 3, for the social
optimum we have:
min
s
Cost(s) = min
k
k ·α−2k =
{
(α/2− 1)n(n− 1) , if α ≤ 2 (clique)
0 , otherwise (disconnected).
Anarchy: In a purely selfish setting, a player connects to another player if
and only if α ≤ 1. By Lemmas 3 and 4, if α ≤ 1, then the resulting equilibrium
topology is the clique and the cost is thus (α/2− 1)n(n− 1), and if α < 1, then
the resulting topology is the set of isolated nodes and the cost is 0.
Cost(Nash equilibrium) =
{
(α/2− 1)n(n− 1) , if α ≤ 1 (clique)
0 , otherwise (disconnected).
Monarchy: Let j denote the monarch and let i 6= j denote any other player.
Since the marginal utility of an additional neighbor of j is one while the con-
nection cost is arbitrarily small (αǫ), a player i will always connect (i.e., pay for
the connection) to the monarch. On the other hand, the monarch will connect
to a player if and only if α ≤ 1. The social cost of the network equilibrium is
therefore always (α− 2)(n− 1) (up to the arbitrarily small ǫ components in the
cost), for any α. ⊓⊔
Using Lemma 9, we can compare the efficiency of the different social settings.
For relatively low connection costs, a setting with a monarch gives stronger in-
centives for nodes to connect, and thus socially more preferable outcomes emerge.
On the other hand, for high connection costs, due to the selfless behavior of the
players ignoring their own connection prices, an anarchy is preferable. As a con-
crete example, according to Lemma 9, for α = 3/2, the equilibrium network of
the monarchic society is a star of utility (n− 1)/2 while in the anarchy nobody
will connect, yielding a utility of zero. On the other hand, for α = 3, the anarchy
again has zero utility, while in the monarchy, players still connect which results
in a negative overall utility of −(n− 1). Thus, the following lemma holds.
Lemma 10. There are situations where the social welfare of anarchy is higher
than the welfare in a monarchy, and vice versa.
4.5 Windfall of Friendship and Price of Ill-Will
An interesting property of our network creation game is that more friendship
relations cannot worsen an equilibrium.
Lemma 11. Consider a social range matrix F where ∀i, j : fij ∈ {0, 1} and
fii = 1. Let F
′ be a social range matrix derived from F where a non-empty
set N of 0-entries in F are flipped to 1. Then, for any equilibrium strategy
sF with respect to a social matrix F , there is an equilibrium strategy sF
′
with
Cost(sF
′
) ≤ Cost(sF ).
Proof. We prove the claim by showing that for any equilibrium strategy sF for F ,
there is an equilibrium strategy sF
′
for F ′ that has at least as many connections
as sF . Moreover, it holds that an equilibrium with more connections always
implies a higher social welfare.
First, recall from Lemma 7 that an equilibrium sF always exists. Now fix
such an equilibrium sF from which we will construct the equilibrium sF
′
. If i
and j are connected in sF , then they are still connected in sF
′
: as R = 1, whether
or not a connection {i, j} between two players i and j is established depends on
the actual costs ca(i, ·) and ca(j, ·) only. If two players i and j are not connected
in sF , they have an incentive to connect in sF
′
if f ′ij = 1 and α ≤ 2. Thus, sF
′
contains a superset of the connections in sF . Now let k be the number of edges in
a given profile s. The social cost is then given by Cost(s) = kα− 2k. For α ≤ 2,
this function is monotonically decreasing, which implies the claim. On the other
hand, for α > 2, the set of isolated nodes constitutes the only equilibrium. ⊓⊔
Lemma 11 implies that the best equilibrium with respect to F ′ cannot be
worse than the best equilibrium with respect to F . On the other hand, it is easy
to see that a similar claim also holds for the worst equilibrium: Consider the
equilibrium sF
′
with the fewest connections k′. Then, there is an equilibrium sF
with k ≤ k′ edges: either sF = sF ′ , or some edges can be removed. We have the
following claim.
Corollary 1. Consider a social range matrix F where ∀i, j : fij ∈ {0, 1} and
fii = 1. Let F
′ be a social range matrix that is derived from F by flipping one
or several 0 entries to 1. Let sFw and s
F
b be the worst and the best equilibrium
profile w.r.t. F , and let sF
′
w and s
F ′
b be the worst and best equilibrium profile
w.r.t. F ′ (maybe sFw = s
F
b and/or s
F ′
w = s
F ′
b ). It holds that Cost(s
F
w) ≥ Cost(sF
′
w )
and Cost(sFb ) ≥ Cost(sF
′
b ).
A analogous result can be obtained for settings where players dislike each other.
Lemma 12. Consider a social range matrix F where ∀i, j : fij ∈ {−1, 0} and
fii = 1. Let F
′ be a social range matrix derived from F where a non-empty set N
of 0-entries in F are flipped to −1s., where |N | ≥ 1. Then, for any equilibrium
strategy sF with respect to a social matrix F , there is an equilibrium strategy sF
′
with Cost(sF ) ≤ Cost(sF ′).
Proof. First recall from the proof of Lemma 11 that the social welfare increases
with the total number of connections given that ∀i : fii = 1, and that it follows
from Lemma 7 that an equilibrium sF always exists. Fix an equilibrium sF to
construct the equilibrium sF
′
. Similarly to the arguments used in the proof of
Lemma 11, if i and j are not connected in sF , then they are disconnected in sF
′
as well. On the other hand, if player i pays for the connection to player j in sF ,
she has an incentive to disconnect in sF
′
if f ′ij = −1 and for any non-negative
α. Thus, sF contains a superset of the connections in sF
′
. ⊓⊔
5 Conclusions and Open Questions
We understand our work as a further step in the endeavor to shed light onto the
socio-economic phenomena of today’s distributed systems which typically consist
of a highly heterogeneous population. In particular, this paper has initiated the
study of economic games with more complex forms of social relationships. We
introduced the concept of social range matrices and studied their properties.
Moreover, we have proved the intuition right (under certain circumstances) that
in our novel network creation game, the social relationships are reflected in the
network topology.
This paper reported only on a small subset of the large number of questions
opened by our model, and we believe that there remain many exciting directions
for future research. For instance, it is interesting to study which conditions are
necessary and sufficient for counter-intuitive phenomena such as the fear factor
and the windfall of malice [4, 17], or the non-monotonous relationship between
welfare and friendship in social networks [15]. Another open question is the
characterization of all topologies that correspond to a Nash equilibrium.
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